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Abstract
It is commonly assumed in sociological theory that legitimation 
plays an important role in the mobilization of collective action; yet, 
the direct effects of legitimacy on collective action remains theoretically 
vague. We develop a theory of the legitimation process that emphasizes its 
constitutive aspects distinguishing between validity— the collective 
orientation to a binding rule, and propriety— an individual's approval 
of the rule. The theory states that validity has direct effects on 
mobilization independent of propriety and also of power and social control. 
We report the results of a laboratory study that isolates these direct 
effects. Within a task group, the communication network creates inequity 
to the disadvantage of the S's. Given the rules of the group, S's defined 
as members with decisionmaking rights, and an institutionalized means of 
changing the network toward equity, group mobilization for change is a 
routine part of the situation. In the experimental condition the network 
is legitimated so that it is linked to the purpose of the study, resulting 
in a significant suppression of mobilization. Further results reveal 
indirect effects of validity on propriety: Within a legitimated system 
individuals act out commitment to the constitutive rules and then organize 
attitudes to conform to that action. We conclude by drawing out the 
implications for the structural relation of legitimacy to collective action.
and tends to ignore legitimacy as a relatively autonomous basis of 
collective action and purpose.
Bachrach and Baratz's (1962; 1963; 1970) theory of nondecisionmaking 
provides a more comprehensive picture of the place of legitimacy in the 
political process. Research on "nondecisions" focuses less on 
mobilization and movements and more on the emergence, shaping, and 
eventual success or failure of an issue as it passes through stages of 
the agenda-setting process. Issues can be defeated at any stage by the 
mobilization of bias (Schattschneider, 1960): the making, reinforcing, 
or invoking of values, beliefs, rules, practices and procedures that make 
actors, issues, and tactics legitimate or illegitimate. Evidence 
suggests that populations are quiescent, no matter how aggrieved, if 
practices are unquestionable or alternatives politically impossible 
(Gaventa, 1980; Moore, 1978). If protest is attempted, it often is 
defined as "crime" and not "protest" (Lauderdale, 1980), and movement 
members are defined as outsiders without legitimate access to the polity, 
making their tactics necessarily illegitimate (Gamson, 1975; Tilly,
1978).
Though they address more fully the role of legitimacy in collective 
action, Bachrach and Baratz do not say much about the direct effects of 
validity: They conceptualize legitimation almost entirely in terms of 
instrumental elite manipulation of rules. Yet, following 
Schattschneider, it is important to recognize that the mobilization of 
bias is structural. It can come into play apart from direct action by 
elites and apart from coercion or the threat of it. The mere everyday 
use of rules within the given institutional contexts can work against
groups that are attempting change. We first formulate and then test this 
hypothesis in the present study.
II. Theory
Legitimacy, rules, and meaning
Weber (1968:31) states that a legitimating order (1) includes or 
entails "determinable maxims" or rules and (2) is held by the collective 
to "define a model or to be binding" within a situation. Action is 
legitimate if it accords with a rule. Many kinds of behavior are not 
rule-governed: Habit, uniformities of action resulting from similar 
interests, convention, custom, and inspiration all are not (Black, 1967; 
Weber, 1968; Wittgenstein,. 1953). In all these cases one could have 
behaved differently without being "incorrect" or "immoral" in what one 
did, whereas rule-governed behavior is normative in prescribing the right 
behavior.
A binding or exemplary rule does not just regulate action, it also 
constitutes it. That is, rules define what actions (and actors, objects 
and circumstances) mean (Douglas, 1973). A coherent, inter-related 
system of rules is a practice or institution (Wittgenstein, 1953). 
Money, banking, marriage, baseball, chess, language, and lawmaking are 
practices—most rather complex ones made up of parts that themselves are 
practices. The institutional order has been described as an ontological 
reality comprised of abstract categories or typifications of people, 
actions, circumstances, and things or entities. Particular actions by 
concrete individuals make sense only in the context or frame of this 
ontological order. The act of paying a bill by check is not meaningful 
apart from the existence of money and banking, getting married is 
meaningful only within the reality of the family and the authority of a
minister or a justice of the peace, stealing a base is nonsensical (and 
possibly illegal) apart from the existence of the game of baseball and 
the entity known as a base.
To act even in the most instrumental way is to act out a social 
reality that is collectively created and shared (Goffman, 1967; 1974). 
If a person is committed to a purpose or line of meaningful action that 
is achievable only within some practice, then either one acts in 
accordance with the !rules or one is not performing the intended action. 
In the latter case, one is a nonperson who has performed a nonact and who 
faces the moral response to violation (Austin, 1961; Garfinkel, 1967). 
In this sense, the constitutive features of rules have profound 
regulatory consequences and are exterior to and constraining on the actor 
in exactly Durkheim's sense (cf. Mulligan and Lederman, 1977). The key 
process is not individual internalization or propriety but rather the 
collective orientation to the legitimating order as part of the external 
natural world of things (Berger and Luckmann, 1966; Meyer et al, 1980; 
Zucker, 1977). Some actors comply with such rules because they in fact 
believe in them, some from habit, custom, or because of a calculation of 
interest and sanctions. Thus, a collective moral order does not 
presuppose "consensus" or uniformity of individual belief; it does 
presuppose that there is a known institutionalized order within the 
collective. It is enough to explain system maintenance and compliance by 
noting that an actor is committed to a purpose and therefore to the 
socially recognized practice by which accomplishing that purpose is 
constituted.
Action is not legitimated by being grounded in disembodied abstract 
societal values or in the presupposed intentions of socialized members.
Rather, it is grounded in specific situated rules within interaction. At 
this level, rules function as accounts in that they provide valid motives 
and identities within the constituted situation (Hills, 1940; Scott and 
Lyman, 1968). Intentions and purpose themselves are actively constructed 
by and interpreted in terms of the rules of the game. This often occurs 
after the fact in attempts at justification and explanation (Garfinkel, 
1967).
There are other types of rules that are less constitutive in nature,
such as regulative or instrumental maxims. Yet, even these have
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constitutive aspects. For example instrumental or performance rules 
constitute the organization of action as a means to do something well, 
skillfully, and effectively. Such rules often legitimate change of 
organization in attempts to improve performance. This would include the 
best ways to swing a golf club, open a chess game, motivate employees, or 
create the best school curriculum. If performance is highly inadequate, 
especially as the demands for efficiency or success are increased, others 
will come to view the actor as not carrying out the task or not knowing 
how to carry it out. We conceptualize rules as varying in the extent to 
which they are an integral part of the legitimating order and crucial to 
the constitution of action, performance, and purpose within a concrete 
situation.
Legitimacy and collective action
Legitimacy processes operate at all stages of social protest. The 
legitimation of a subgroup and its demands on the center are especially 
important in its mobilization of resources and public support (e.g., 
Gamson, 1975; McCarthy and Zald, 1977; Morris, 1981; Ragin et al., 1982; 
Snyder, 1975; Tilly, 1978). Changes in constitutive rules of
political-economic structures are integral to theoretical 
conceptualizations of regime instability (e.g., Lipset, 1959), social 
revolution (Skocpol, 1979), and in the experimental literature to 
revolutionary coalitions (Michener and Lawler, 1971). The delegitimation 
of a regime results in an increase in the validity of collective demands, 
the delegitimation of the use of violence by the regime and the overall 
level of collective action (cf., Gamson, 1975; Thomas and Meyer, 1980).
We suggest that legitimacy as an externally valid institution has 
its most dramatic effects at the earlier stages of protest. Rules that 
govern action make alternative courses of action nonsensical and immoral 
(Berger and Luckmann, 1966). Change in action presupposes change in the 
legitimating frame to which the collective is oriented and in which 
action is constituted, which is accomplished through 
collective-action— sometimes from the top downward. Change by an 
individual or subgroup is not change; it simply is not "doing" the 
correct action, and the actor consequently is defined as a nonmember or a 
(political) deviant and as raising a nonissue. One therefore gives up 
purpose and identity or gives up changing the institutional order. The 
result is system reproduction via nondecisionmkaing.
Structural bias against change is seen most dramatically when a 
system of inequality is defined as equitable, but even when inequities or
injustices exist and are collectively perceived as such, attempts at
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change may be infrequent (Moore, 1978; Weber, 1946). It often is 
difficult to formulate alternatives given the embeddedness of a given 
rule in the larger system of practices governing the situation. To 
change one aspect leads to seemingly overwhelming change throughout the 
system that would call into question the very purpose of the collective.
Even if possible alternatives are formulated and means of change are ׳ 
institutionally given, attempts to mobilize action might be low. 
Specifically, if the rule is so embedded in the constitutive order as to 
make change in it result in the breakdown of situational meaning and 
purpose, then the initiation of mobilizing collective action is unlikely. 
If the unjust rule is not crucial to the constitution of action, 
performance, or purpose, mobilization is likely. In short, the more 
directly a rule is linked to collective, situational purpose, the less 
likely mobilization of collective action will occur.
The resulting hypothesis is that the validity of a practice has a 
direct negative effect on attempts at mobilizing collective action 
oriented to change of an unjust situation. This effect is structural in 
that it is not a function of instrumental elite manipulation or the 
threatened use of power; nor is it a result of individuals personally 
evaluating the situation as fair and appropriate.
The experiment as a social practice
The present paper employs experimental methods to test this 
hypothesis. This is useful first of all because the hypothesis requires 
effective control of the threat of coercion and the measuring and 
tracking of individual beliefs in propriety, iY" is also useful because 
an experiment is itself a highly institutionalized social practice. 
Subjects (S's) who volunteer for experiments typically are committed to 
the purposes of science in general and the experiment in particular 
(Adair, 1973). This makes the demand characteristics of experiments 
(Orne, 1962) useful for investigating legitimation processes. Any set of 
experimental instructions affects the conduct of S's in the experiment by 
placing it within a particular frame: the purposes of the experiment and
how the actions constituted by its rules accomplish those purposes 
(Goffman, 1974). Most experimental manipulations do not alter the frame 
of the experiment itself, but there is no real barrier to doing so, and 
in the present study we use manipulations of the frame of the experiment 
to alter the significance of collective action in relation to it.
In the experiment, S is given a task, a way to perform it, and a 
particular network for communicating with other S's. The communication 
network and reward structure result in a reward allocation that is both 
objectively and subjectively inequitable; that is, it is neither valid 
nor proper. There is a valid mechanism for changing the communication 
network that requires mobilization of other actors because it 
necessitates a group decision and shared cost. The legitimacy of a S's 
initiating mobilization depends on the situated frame. In the control 
condition mobilization toward change preserves the basic objectives of 
the experiment. In the experimental condition the situation still is 
defined as inequitable but change in the network would damage the purpose 
and meaning of the situation. In the control condition we expect a high 
rate of initiating collective action as a routine aspect of the task 
group. In the experimental situation, S's are oriented to and by the 
rules which constitute it as a practice— rules that are crucially linked 
to the communication network. Thus, even against material interest and 
definitions of injustice, and even though the S's are full members with 
access to collective mechanism of change, the constitutive rules of 
action will prevent attempts to change the situation.
Ill• M e t h o d «
Subjects, setting and procedure
Subjects in this investigation were male students , undergraduates 
and graduates, who served as paid volunteers. When recruited, the 
participants were told that they could earn, on the average, around $6.50 
for helping in a study of communication systems.
The setting consists of a set of rooms, one for each S and each 
equipped with a desk, chair, television monitor, signalling device, and a 
variety of message slips. When S's arrived at the laboratory, they each 
drew a colored token which corresponded to one of the rooms. They were 
led to believe that the draw was at random. The colors of the tokens 
were used to identify the participants throughout the study.
Participants received video-taped instructions that indicated that - 
they were members of a five-person group which would work two practice 
problems and then a series of ten criterion problems. Each problem or 
trial required the construction of a series of five-point, multi-line 
graphs (cf. Faucheux and Mackenzie, 1966; Mackenzie, 1976). At the 
beginning of a trial, each S had information which corresponded to two 
lines of the solution graph. Completing a problem required that each 
member collect the information of the other four, from that information 
construct the graph, and then send the completed graph to the office 
staff. The exchange of information and all communication were 
restricted to written messages, hand carried by staff messengers. The 
message slips were designed so that S's could send only task information 
to others and only the completed answers to the office. A problem was 
completed when the office had received an answer from each of the five 
members. There was then a short rest period after which the office sent
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a written message to each S informing them of the team earnings on the 
problem just completed and instructing them to begin the next problem.
The study was presented to all S's in both conditions as an 
investigation of "the various kinds of communication systems that can be 
used when people must work together but can communicate only indirectly 
by written messages." It was made clear that cooperation and accurate 
transmission of messages were necessary for any member of the group to 
correctly solve the problems. As a consequence, all earnings were to be 
awarded to the group. Each member of the team was to submit an answer, 
and the group would receive $0.25 for each correct answer submitted on 
each trial. The group earnings were to be divided equally among the 
members at the end of the study. In this manner, the equal distribution 
of rewards was constituted as equitable and just.
The communication network
Each group of S׳s was assigned to a Bavalas (1950) "wheel" that 
consisted of a central position (played by a confederate) and four 
peripheral positions. Each peripheral position could communicate 
directly only with the center. They could communicate with each other 
only by marking on the message that the center should forward it to a 
particular person. Although the center had to forward it, he could read 
the information before passing it on. In actuality all messages were 
returned to the staff. In this manner all messages, both sent and 
received by the S's, were strictly controlled and monitored.^
The network was never presented graphically but described in the 
taped instructions and in a printed list of open and closed channels. 
S׳s were reminded that they had been randomly assigned to positions and 
that individual ability was irrelevant to the study.
Mobilization of collective action
The group members were instructed that they could alter the commu­
nication network by renting additional communication channels at a cost 
of five cents per channel for each trial during which the channel was 
rented. Channels could also be closed at no cost. A majority of the 
group had to approve the action before any channels could be opened or 
closed, and rental costs were to be divided equally among the five 
members. Each member had a list of open and closed channels, and the 
exact procedure for opening and closing them was explained during the 
instructions: Any member could initiate specific network changes by 
filling out a rental request form, specifying what channels were to be 
opened and/or closed, and sending it to a fellow team member. The 
instructions made it clear that (1) the central position had to forward 
it (although he also could read it) and (2) if the member who received 
the request approved it he would send it to the office which would then 
take a vote of the five members. Rental requests could be sent only 
during the rest periods.
As soon as a participant sent a rental request to a teammate, he was 
stopped. Since all messages received by a participant were simulated by 
the staff and since all messages sent by a participant were intercepted 
by the staff messengers and never delivered to the others, the others
were completely independent subjects and therefore continued.^
We interpret the initiating of the rental process as an attempt by a
member to mobilize collective action using a collectively acceptable 
mechanism: Each S can request the support of another to put the issue of 
changing the source of request on the collective agenda. This action
puts demands on the whole group in that the costs of the proposed change 
would be shared by all.
This setting and procedure allow us to ascertain (1) the proportion 
of S's who initiate change in the communication network and (2) at what 
point in the series of ten problems they do so. The second piece of 
information is important because a rental request at say trial seven is 
different than at say trial two. In the former case, mobilization has 
been delayed and its initiation has overcome the inertia and lack of 
activity of others. Because S’s are terminated when they first suggest a 
change, each can be characterized as surviving for a certain number of 
trials. If someone sends a rental request during the rest period after 
problem two, for example, then that S "survived" through two problems. 
The number of trials that individuals complete is represented by a 
survival curve which is our dependent variable.
Creating inequity and collective action
After the two practice problems a short questionnaire was given to 
the S's. After they returned the questionnaires, and before the start of 
the ten criterion problems, the study director reappeared on the monitor 
and indicated that although the team had done well on the practice 
problems, it was thought that they could work faster. He stated that, as 
an incentive for individual members to work more quickly, for each 
problem a bonus of $1.25 would be awarded to the individual who submitted 
the correct solution first. The bonus was over and above team earnings 
and was not divisible. The S's were informed who won the bonus on a 
given problem along with team earnings after the rest period. Each S 
quickly perceived that because of the communication network the central 
position would always receive all of the information first, precluding
other members winning the bonus unless the network was changed or the 
rules violated. This meant that the center could earn as much as $15, 
$12.50 in bonus money alone, whereas the peripheral participant could 
earn $2.50 at the most.
The S's were initially led to believe that they were all similar in 
age, sex and education and that they had the same amounts of information 
so that they could expect to earn equal amounts in a cooperative 
situation. Within this context, the administration of a sizable bonus 
based on competition within an exchange network that insured the center's 
winning the bonus, creates both inequity and material interest in 
changing the structure.
We initially legitimated changing the communication network by 
describing in detail the procedure that an individual could take to 
initiate opening and/or closing communication channels.^ This condition 
therefore gives us a baseline measure of protest: attempts to mobilize 
support for changing the communication structure, using an institution­
alized collective mechanism of voting for rental. Pretests of it led us
to believe that it would be characterized by a survival curve in which
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the majority of S's did not survive beyond the third problem. 
Non-mobilizing action
Through extensive pretests we found that because of the openness of 
the experimental setting, S's are capable of circumventing the inequity 
and the material disadvantage in two other ways which we describe as 
non-collective or non-mobilizing because they do not attempt to change 
the rules of the game nor do they attempt to mobilize collective action 
around claims of inequity. First, S's can send the wrong information to 
the center. This would result in only that person having the correct
answer and consequently receiving the bonus. He need only do this twice 
before attaining a fair share of the bonus. However, this would hurt the 
earnings of all of the S's, not just that of the center; it would 
undermine team performance by insuring four wrong answers; and if more 
than one member pursued this activity on the same problem, no one would 
get the correct answer or bonus. A second non-mobilizing response is 
simply to refuse to send information to the center. By holding out, one 
would hope to force the center to send all of the other 
information—otherwise the problem would never be completed. Again, this 
response is at the expense of team efficiency and possibly of team 
earnings. Because neither of these responses constitute attempts to 
mobilize others toward getting the issue of inequity on the collective 
agenda, we do not count them as collective action. We ran subjects until 
we attained twenty in each condition (ten graduates and ten 
undergraduates) that either did not protest at all or responded by 
initiating collective action by renting. A total of five participants 
responded non-collectively in the baseline condition and eleven did so in 
the legitimacy condition before the twenty were attained. Thus there are 
totals of 25 and 31 subjects in the baseline and legitimacy conditions,
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respectively. We first analyze the entire sample, contrasting no 
protest with protest, with the latter including both mobilizing protest 
(rental) and non-mobilizing protest (N■=56). We then perform identical 
analyses after excluding participants with non-mobilizing responses 
(N~40). This second set of analyses focuses on our primary interest of 
the effects of legitimacy on the initiation of collective action in order 
to get an issue on the collective agenda. We anticipate that results 
will be similar in both analyses.
Legitimating the communication network
In the experimental condition, the communication network is 
legitimated so that any change in it would damage the purpose of the 
experiment. We legitimated the stucture by linking it directly to the 
purpose of the scientific situation, concretely defining the purpose of 
the experiment and therefore participation in it as "using this 
structure." This delegitimates change in that changing the network while 
still possible would cause the situation to become without purpose and in 
that sense disorderly. In addition to the general purpose read to S's in 
both conditions, after the first practice problem the study director gave 
information over the monitor about the purposes of the study; this 
information was said to be important for the individuals to understand in 
order for them to participate adequaltely. An elaborate history of 
scientific research into this particular communication network was 
fabricated and was described both verbally and by a summary chart over 
each S's desk. The fact that the rental procedure was available was 
explained by the fact that the experiment replicated in all detail this 
prior research. The director summarized by saying,
What we want to study is the detailed pattern of informa­
tion flow in restricted communication systems. On the eighth 
problem we will measure the detailed pattern of information flow.
To successfully measure this pattern, we need you to continue 
with the same restricted communication system for at least eight 
problems after you complete the two practice problems.
The participants then performed the second practice problem, filled out a 
short questionnaire, heard the description of the bonus (which created
inequity in a situation which until then was equal and fair), and then 
began the criterion problems.
The operational hypothesis
In both conditions S's have a legitimate claim that the situation Is 
unfairly disadvantageous to them because of the bonus and communication 
network. In both conditions, they are equal members of the group with 
decisionmaking rights and equal access to initiating legitimate 
mechanisms of change. In the baseline condition, collective action will 
take the form of using the change mechanism as a routine part of the task 
situation. In the legitimation condition, the valid scientific context 
becomes concretely linked to the network by the rule delineated in the 
manipulation. In orienting themselves to participating in the study, 
individuals will come to realize that action is constituted by that rule. 
Therefore in the interest of maintaining meaning and purpose, S's will 
carry out lines of action that will preserve the communication structure 
for at least eight problems. The mechanism of change is still legitimate 
and defined as an integral part of legitimate political activity, but 
change itself is delegitimated and counter to the nature of participation 
in the situation. Thus, S's will resign themselves to inequity or 
attempt to right the situation through means other than changing the 
structure. The proportion of S's sending rental requests will be less in 
the experimental condition than in the baseline, and the requests that 
are sent will occur later in the sequence of trials.
This is a direct effect of validity. The manipulation is designed 
to establish validity of the network but not its propriety. At no point 
do we say that the communication structure is the best or most efficient 
nor do we on any other basis state that S's should view this structure as
proper. Additionally, power, threat of coercion, or direct social
control by the experimenter or other S's are excluded from the
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situation.
Since we legitimate the structure and delegitimate change for only 
the first eight problems, there may be frequent attempts to change after 
that point without it bearing negatively on our hypothesis; however, by 
that time inequity is ensured, and we expect most people will not bother . 
changing at that point. We hypothesize that the survival curve of the 
legitimacy condition will show more S's surviving through eight problems 
than that of the baseline for all S's but especially when examining only 
collective protest and excluding non-mobilizing responses.
IV. Results and Discussion 
Collective action
When including non-mobilizing action as protest, the proportion of 
S's surviving through each trial is shown in columns two and three of 
Table 1; Figure 1 displays the corresponding survival curve, plotting the 
proportion of participants surviving through each problem against the 
problem number. There is a dramatic difference between the two 
conditions. In the baseline, 84 percent of the 25 participants tried to 
circumvent the inequity, all but one of these before problem eight, and 
68 percent of the 25 before problem four. When the structure was 
legitimated and change was delegitimated, 55 percent of 31 participants 
attempted some form of action; 20 percent did so after problem eight, 
leaving only 35 percent who attempted to get around the inequity before 
problem eight.
Table 1 and Figure 1 about here
The statistical significance of the difference between these two 
curves can be calculated by a logrank test (Peto, et al., 1977). As 
participants attempt to change the structure, or attempt to circumvent it 
through non-mobilizing action, they are terminated. The expected value 
of protest in a condition at a given trial is therefore a function of the 
proportion of the experimental sample left in that condition at that 
trial: This is the proportion exposed to risk of termination. The 
logrank test calculates an expected value for each condition by summing 
the different expected values of each trial for that condition. The 
degree of difference between the observed and expected protest, across 
treatments behaves similarly to chi-square, and statistical significance
can be ascertained by using the chi-square distribution with k-1 degrees
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of freedom (see Peto, et al, 1977). The X  for our conditions is 10.12 
(d.f. = 1, p 4.005, using a one-tailed test because we are hypothesizing 
that the legitimacy condition has a lower rate of change than the 
baseline).
The analysis of collective agenda-setting action, with non-mobiliz­
ing protest excluded, shows that the effects of legitimacy on collective 
action is even more pronounced (see Table 1, columns four and five; and 
Figure 2). In the baseline condition, 80 percent of the 20 participants 
tried to change the communication network, all of them before problem 
eight and 75 percent of them before problem four.^ In the legitimacy 
condition, only 30 percent of 20 participants attempted change
with only ten percent of the 20 initiating change before problem eight. 
The y? for the difference between the two survival curves is 12.17 (d.f.
* 1, p ^ .001).
Figure 2 about here
The hypothesis is clearly supported. Even though maintaining 
the communication structure perpetuates inequity and even though it works 
against the material interest of the S's, they do not attempt to change 
the structure nearly as much when the structure is legitimated and change 
is delegitimated. The communication network constitutes and gives 
meaning and purpose to the study and to participation within it, causing 
individuals to orient action toward it. Changing the communication 
structure would result in the breakdown of the situation for both self 
and other. Thus, changing the system in order to establish a fair 
structure or in order to pursue material interest is actively suppressed 
at the stage of S's not even attempting to mobilize collective action and 
to get the issue on the agenda.
Non-mobilizing protest
There are two possible effects of the validity manipulation on 
non-mobilizing protest such as withholding information, sending incorrect 
information, and ending participation. It might delegitimate change in 
general, causing a reduction of all attempts to circumvent the system.
On the other hand, this manipulation does not decrease or redefine 
inequity. Because the inequity resulting from the bonus and the struc­
ture still remains, this manipulation might cause an increase in 
alternative, non-mobilizing responses. We tended to favor the latter
possibility and expect to see a larger number of non-mobilizing responses 
in the legitimacy condition than in the baseline. If we legitimated the 
unequal system as equitable and just, then we would have expected to see 
a decline in all types of protest. The present study was not designed to 
analyze these possibilities in detail; however, we were able to keep 
track of non-mobilizing responses and can tentatively see which 
alternative results.
There are three results that are suggestive. First, there is a 
strikingly high level of non-mobilizing protest in both conditions. Even 
in the baseline condition 5 of the 25 S's protested without attempting to 
mobilize collective action (i.e., renting), constituting about a quarter 
of the 21 total protests in this condition. Thus, even in the most 
conducive circumstances protest takes individuated non-collective forms. 
Second, although the differences are not statistically significant, there 
is more non-mobilizing protest in the experimental condition in which 11 
of 31 S’s attempted to circumvent inequity. This is 35Z of S׳s and, 
more striking, 65% of all changes in this condition. This suggests that 
the effect of the validity manipulation on initiating change does not 
generalize to all other action that addresses inequity, most likely 
because the manipulation leaves the situation defined as unjust.
A third interesting finding is that the legitimation manipulation 
appears to increase more generally illegitimate behavior. In the 
baseline condition all five nonmobilizing responses are the withholding 
of information from the center in order to force it to send information 
to other S's first. In the validity condition, five S's withheld 
information, five sent false information and one stopped participation in 
the experiment. While only 5 S’s sent false information ("cheated"), we 
nevertheless find it suggestive. Such action is illegitimate in both the
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experiment and the larger cultural context, but it is not directly 
threatening to the collective purpose of the study, as is the changing of 
the communication network. This suggests that tactics which are 
abstractly illegitimate are less compelling if they are not specifically 
linked to situated collective meaning and purpose, even if it is presumed 
that actors have internalized the larger cultural values. Thus, given a 
range of illegitimate tactics, those which are most closely linked to 
situated meaning or to the collective purpose are the least likely to be 
used while there is an increasing probability of use as the rules become 
only generally and abstractly present. This might be offset by specific 
social sanctioning mechanisms which, however, have been abstracted out of 
the experimental situation.
A note on performance rules
The present validity manipulation grew out of a protracted series of 
pretests that attempted to establish both the validity and propriety of 
the communication structure. We attempted to convince S's through the 
presentation of objective scientific evidence that this was the best, 
most efficient network. In order to accomplish this, we placed the task 
and experimental situation in a long line of research on indirect 
communication. We emphasized the importance of the network being the 
most efficient or simply the best, and we asserted explicitly several 
times, both verbally and in print, that this system was in fact the best 
because previous research had determined it to be the. most efficient. We 
were successful in instituting this context in that our manipulation 
clearly defined efficiency as the ground of action. In the baseline 
condition in which this presentation did not occur, the justifications 
used by the participants infrequently referred to efficiency, especially 
for those who attempted to change the structure. However, in the
legitimacy condition, the manipulation had the contextual effect that 
action—whether protest or not—was justified by considerations of 
efficiency. Those that did not attempt to change the structure thought 
that the system was unfair, but also thought that it was efficient and 
therefore probably should not be changed. Those that initiated renting 
thought that the system was unfair, but they justified their action not 
so much by claims of inequity, but primarily by asserting that the system 
was not efficient and that they were attempting to establish a more 
efficient one. Some that initiated renting thought the system was 
fair— the central person deserved the extra bonus money because there was 
more work in that position—but they reported that the reason they 
attempted to change the structure was because it did not seem efficient.
While our manipulation clearly shifted the contextual ground of 
action to efficiency, it failed to establish the legitimacy of the 
communication network in that it did not institute a belief or a "fact" 
that the system being used was the best one. We found through 
interviewing that reporting that the system of communication "has proved 
to be the best" or "the most efficient" was interpreted as being "so far" 
and the purpose of the study—and participation in it—was to find the 
most efficient communication network. Our post hoc interpretation is 
that given within at least student culture is the knowledge that a 
scientific study is to generate new data independent of previous 
research. Thus, the manipulation constituted the situation is such a way 
as to make performance criteria crucial to interpreting successful 
participation. Participants come to focus on performance standards of 
efficiency, and whatever will improve their performance within the limits 
of the experiment is morally imperative. Efficiency, as the purpose of 
the study, provided not only a ready-made motive for change, but a
ready-made account for change no matter what the "real" motive of the 
participant. Thus, a legitimating order can constitute action around 
performance rules that link ongoing action to the frame only as a means 
to an end. The constitutive purpose is to find the most efficient means; 
this "project" in itself is a powerful legitimation for change in the 
given organization of action (Meyer et al., 1980).
Validity, behavior and propriety
In shifting our approach, we manipulated experimentally only 
validity: The communication network is legitimated by an external, valid 
rule that linked the network to the goals of the study within the larger 
context of scientific research. The participant's action was oriented 
toward maintaining this structure. While not attempting to manipulate 
propriety of the structure in terms of the individual's approving it or 
thinking it in some way being the best or most efficient, our 
standardized procedure allowed us to measure the resulting effects, if 
any, on individual propriety. In a short questionnaire administered 
after the second practice problem (after the legitimation manipulation in 
the experimental condition) but before the description of the bonus (the
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introduction of inequity), and in a post-session questionnaire, we asked 
the participants if they approved of the communication network and if 
they thought it was efficient. These two measurements are PROPRIETY^ and 
PROPRIETY^, respectively. We had expected that in reaction to the 
inequity of the bonus and network S's would reduce the degree to which 
they perceived the structure as proper in both the baseline and validity 
conditions. The results (see Table 2) show that those in the legitimacy 
condition did not change in this direction as much as those in the 
baseline. Excluding non-mobilizing responses, when asked before the
bonus was introduced if they approved the structure, the S's in the 
baseline condition had a mean score of A.00; this went to 2.15 when the 
question was asked after the session. In the legitimacy condition, the 
PROPRIETY^ and PROPRIETY2 scores were 3.74 and 3.37, respectively. The 
difference between the means in the baseline is statistically significant 
whereas that in the legitimacy condition is not. Similar results are 
found for the question on efficiency. In the baseline condition the 
before and after scores are 4.0 and 3.0, indicating a decrease in per­
ceived efficiency of the network. In the legitimacy condition the scores 
are 3.8 and 4.05, indicating a slight increase in perceived efficiency. 
The decline of means in the baseline condition is statistically signifi­
cant; the slight increase in propriety in the legitimacy condition is not 
statistically significant.
Table 2 about here
A similar pattern is found when non-mobilizing responses are includ­
ed. There is a large drop in approval in the baseline condition from 
4.00 to 2.04. There is also a decrease in approval when the communica­
tion network is legitimated with scores changing from 3.70 to 3.0. 
Although change in both conditions are statistically significant, the 
decrease of approval in the legitimacy condition is only about one third 
the magnitude of decrease in the baseline condition. Examining perceived 
efficiency, there is a statistically significant decrease in the baseline 
condition from 4.00 to 2.73. There is no loss of perceived efficiency 
when the communication structure is legitimated; before and after scores 
are 3.74 and 3.52, respectively.
It appears that the legitimacy of the communication network lessened 
the likelihood that people link inequity to it and inhibited their 
thinking that the network was improper and inefficient. This occurs 
despite the fact that the validity manipulation did not directly affect 
propriety: The means of the questions when asked initially are not 
statistically different between conditions for either the approval or 
efficiency questions.
How does validity prevent the erosion of propriety? The nature of 
the effects of validity on propriety, whether direct or indirect, can be 
studied by analyzing different causal models of the legitimacy effects of 
PROPRIETY• The three most reasonable models of the process are shown in 
Table 3. Model I states that the validity manipulation directly affects 
propriety which then determines behavior (trials). The notion is that 
although measured after the session, propriety reflects S's reporting the 
underlying prior attitude that caused them to behave the way they did. 
This directly contradicts our theory, and as noted, alreay is somewhat 
unsupported in that there is no initial difference in propriety across 
conditions. Model II states that validity directly affects trials which 
shapes personal propriety as reported in the post-session interview. 
Consistent with our theory, evaluations are accounts that justify the 
acted-out commitment to the organization of interaction. Model III 
states that validity directly governs both trials and propriety and that 
there is only a spurious correlation between the latter two. The path 
coefficients predicted by each model are included in the table and are 
tested by ordinary least squares regression analyses. Table 4 presents 
the analysis of the effects of validity on trials controlling for 
propriety. Equations were estimated using approval (Eqs. la - 2b) and
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efficiency (Eqs. 3a - 4b) as the measures of propriety; these were 
estimated first using all responses and then just collective action. 
Equations labelled "a" control only for PROPRIETY^, and those labelled 
"b" also control for PROPRIETY^. By comparing each pair of equations 
(e.g., la with lb), we can assess the results of controlling for 
PROPRIETY .
Prediction 1.1 is unsupported because all comparisons show that when 
controlling for PROPRIETY^ the effect of VALIDITY on TRIALS decreases 
only slightly but remains essentially the same. These equations also 
contradict prediction III.2 in that the relation of PROPRIETY^ to TRIALS 
is not zero or close to zero when controlling for VALIDITY. The most 
revealing results are found in Table 5 which reports the effect of 
VALIDITY on PR0PRIETY2 controlling only for PROPERTYx (Eqs. ,,a") and then 
also for TRIALS (Eqs. "b"). In all cases, when controlling for TRIALS 
the large effect of VALIDITY on PROPIETY^ drops substantially and no 
longer is significantly different from zero. This refutes predictions
1.3 and III.3 (as well as III.2) and supports a crucial and unique 
prediction of Model II.
Tables 4 and 5 about here
We infer that validity affects propriety indirectly through its 
effects on behavior as summarized in Figure 3. A valid order, in 
defining meaningful behavior, commits individuals to particular lines of 
behaving so as to preserve that order independent of personal attitudes. 
In carrying out this behavior they reorganize preferences and evaluations 
so as to support and justify their behavior as well as the larger order.
Figure 3 about here
V. Conclusions
The basic finding of this study is that when change is legitimate, 
mobilizing collective action to correct inequity becomes a routine aspect 
of ongoing activity; however, when the social organization is legitimated 
so that change would damage collective purpose participants behaviorally 
support the order by conforming to the social organization and by not 
attempting to change it—even though the structure generates what is 
collectively defined as inequity to their disadvantage. This occurs when 
change is possible and specifically delineated and individuals have full 
access.
The validity manipulation framed participation in such a way that 
the social organization was directly linked to that frame— to the 
maintenance of situated purpose and meaning. This delegitimated change 
in that to change the network would mean either calling into question the 
nature and purpose of the study or simply deciding not to participate. 
This was a direct effect: It was independent of propriety, and social 
control and power were not relevant to the participant's action.
Interestingly, there is an increase in action abstractly 
illegitimate in the larger culture such as sending false information. 
People seem to prefer legitimate avenues of redress, but given a choice 
among illegitimate tactics, they tend to choose ones (withholding 
information and sending wrong information) that preserve the validity and 
purpose of the situation over one (changing the structure) that would 
destroy situated purpose and meaning. This appears to be especially
powerful when one considers the larger cultural forces against 
"cheating."
Legitimating orders may frame the situation so as to increase 
collective action. Our initial manipulation framed the group task with 
goals of efficiency. This caused individuals to orient themselves to 
performance standards that increased the level of mobilization by 
providing a ready-made account for justifying change.
A second major finding is that validity can lead to individuals 
positively evaluating a structure. This effect is mediated by behavior: 
Individuals act out commitment to the valid order and then bring 
attitudes and motives into conformity. A s■summarized by Mills who was 
analyzing the effects of macro accounts on micro interactions, "The long 
acting out of a role, with its appropriate motives, will often induce a 
|personJ to become what at first {s^he merely sought to appear 
(1940:398)." This goes a long way in revealing the strength of 
nondecisionmaking effects early in the collective action process.
Through a period of conforming to a particular social organization and 
using a valid order to explain and justify behavior, individuals come to 
view the social organization as proper. This might be reinforced by the 
lack of protest from others leading to attributes of collective approval 
which would then support change in ones own propriety (cf. Walker et al, 
1985; Zelditch and Walker, 1984).
Even those participants who thought the communication structure was 
proper did not view the allocation of the bonus as just. The 
legitimation of one aspect of the situation did not generalize to all 
aspects and neither did the use of the bonus generate propriety of the 
reward structure. This is due to the fact that the outcomes are clearly
defined as violating the equal distribution of rewards and the bonus was 
never linked to the purpose and constitutive arrangements of the study. 
Interestingly, despite a more focused perception on the bonus as the 
source of inequity, there was no attempt to discuss or change the bonus, 
except indirectly when during the post-session interview several people 
suggested change in future studies. This results because the bonus 
allocation rule is simply given with no possible alternatives presented, 
no right of the participants to question it, and no vehicle for putting 
it on the agenda.
All aspects of social organization (such as rules of resource 
distribution, manner and structure of communication, role definitions, 
and situated accounts) often come to be framed as constituting the 
rationale and purpose of the collective. That is, social organization is 
commonly viewed as important and crucial in carrying out and attaining 
social purpose, but it also often comes to define value attainment.
Thus, attempts to change any aspect of social organization are viewed as 
threatening to the purpose and meaning of the enterprize—whether it be a 
society, organization, or structured situation. This linkage of situated 
rules to the larger order appears to be a major force of structural bias 
against change and illustrates how easily this bias is mobilized even 
apart from overt action. Certainly such action, including the use or 
threat of power, plays an important role in political situations, but the 
dynamics of legitimacy are at least in part structural and independent of 
such factors.
A situation or aspects of a situation in which change is not even 
"possible" and a situation in which "inequity" is redefined as "equity" 
are extreme versions of mobilization of bias and nondecisionmaking. .Yet,
even in a situation in which clearly perceived inequity can be corrected 
by changing the structure of interaction, if ongoing activity is 
organized by a validating order, there are low levels of initiating 
collective action; this in turn leads people to positively evaluate that 
organization.
Notes
1. Related investigations of the indirect effects of validity and other 
relevant research are reviewed by Zelditch and Walker (1984).
2. On the interconnectedness of constitutive and regulatory rules, see 
Gumb, 1972; Anscombe, 1958; and Hare, 1964. A common point is that 
constituting reality creates regulation, and regulating action assumes an 
ontology. Geertz (1974) addresses this issue in discussing the relation 
of world view and ethos.
3. Legitimacy is a more general process than equity which ultimately 
must be analyzed within a theory of legitimacy. For example, the 
literature suggests that the clearer the rules are concerning exactly 
what is objectively given, the clearer the definitions of equity within a 
particular situation and the more discernable the effects of equity on 
behavior (e.g., Berger et al., 1972; Cook, 1975).
4. An analysis of gender differences have been carried out and reported 
elsewhere (Walker and Smith-Donals, 1981).
5. In the few cases where a participant tried to communicate by writing
»
messages over the printed information slips, these attempts were 
systematically ignored by the center.
6. After the S's were stopped or after they completed all ten trials, 
they filled out a post-session questionnaire, were interviewed, 
debriefed, and paid. During the debriefing, all deceptions were revealed 
and explained, and S's were given the opportunity to ask questions about 
procedures and the study in general.
7. Changing the manner in which the bonus was distributed would also 
correct the disadvantage and inequity. However, aside from refusing to
continue with the study (which one participant did) there was no manner 
in which the bonus could be changed. This in itself is a demonstration 
of the process we are examining: The fact that changing the bonus is not 
even possible, that it is part of the ground within which solutions 
centering on the "figure” are decided upon, makes protest unthinkable.
8. Thus, any tendency to delay or prevent the issue from emerging in 
the experimental condition cannot be interpreted as absence of an issue. 
The comparison with the control condition means that such differences 
must be seen as suppression of the issue by the manipulated experimental 
conditions. On the controversy over empirically identifying 
"nondecisions" and distinguishing them from "nonissues" see Frey, 1971; 
Polsby, 1980; Wolfinger, 1971; and Zelditch, et al, 1983.
9. In attaining the criterion number of participants, we excluded 
individuals who misunderstood the task, did not perceive any inequity, 
did not hear the experimental manipulation, or were suspicious. The 
total rate of exclusion was 31 percent, 32 percent in the baseline and 30 
percent in the legitimacy conditions.
10. This manipulation makes use of the rational legitimating properties 
of scientific research as well as the authority of the head experimenter. 
However, the manipulation is not dependent upon the director's personal 
authority nor on any legitimated use of power. A previous study (Walker,
1979) attempted to manipulate personal authority in particular and showed 
its inability to affect protest. Additionally, the experimenter is 
physically absent from the situation. No formal or informal sanctions 
from any of the staff are present: (1) They only carry messages and 
clarify instructions and (2) according to university rules, we make it 
clear that S's can stop participation, and in effect bring the study to a
halt with no pressure or questions asked. Additionally, no power 
relations are at work within the five-member task group. There are, of 
course, the inherent consequences of violating collective purpose, but 
these result from structural process—not the exercise of power.
11. One reason why in the baseline condition the highest proportion of 
initiating renting takes place immediately after trial three is that many 
participants wait to see if the center will allow others to .get the 
bonus. The center's winning the bonus on the first and then on the 
second trials leads some to infer that he will not give up the bonus.
With an equitable distribution being two bonuses per member, the center's 
winning the third bonus insures inequity and seemingly confirms to most 
of the participants that he is in fact unconcerned with equity.
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Table 1: The Proportion of Individuals Not Protesting (Surviving) 
Through Each Trial.
Collective Action Only 
Baseline Legitimacy
(N=20)(N=20)
All Protest Included
Legitimacy
(N=31)
Baseline
(N=25)
Trial
Number
1.00
1.00
.95
.95
.90
.90
.90
.90
.75
.70
1.00
.75
.60
.25
.25
.20
.20
.20
.20
.20
1.00
.97
.94
.87
.74
.68
.65
.65
.52
.45
1.00
.76
.64
.32
.28
.20
.20
.20
.16
.16
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8 
9
10
3־X2 = 10.12, d.f. = 1, p < .005, one-tailed test.
^Non—mobilizing responses excluded. X 2 = 12.17, d.f. = 1, p < .001, 
one-tailed test.
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Table 2: Assessing the Effects of Validity on Propriety : Before and
After Scores of Propriety by Condition
Before After
g
Question Condition (Propriety^) (Propriety2) t d.f.
b
P
All responses
Approval Baseline 4.00 2.04 3.85 24 .001
Approval Validity 3.70 3.00 2.10 29 .044
Efficiency Baseline 4.00 2.73 8.12 21 .000
Efficiency Validity 3.74 3.52 .76 30 .451
c
Collective Action only
Approval Baseline 4.00 2.15 7.28 19 .000
Approval Validity 3.74 3.37 .92 18 .368
Efficiency Baseline 4.00 3.00 2.92 16 .010
Efficiency Validity 3.80 4.05 - .82 19 .425
8answer categories are coded "1" = highly disapprove or very inefficient to
"5" = highly approve or very efficient
*5Two-tailed test.
0Non-mobilizing protest excluded.
Tab*le 3: Models of Validity, Behavior and Propriety with Predictions of Path 
Coefficients for each Model.
I
Validity--►Propriety--►Trials
1.1. / V t . p =  0
1.2. /^pt.v= pt
1.3. /^vp.t= vp
II
Validity--- ► Trials---►Propriety
II. 1. vt.p= /^vt
11 .2. /¿pt .v= Pt
11.3. /'vp.t= 0
III
_  Propriety
Validity
Trials
111.1 v־t.p= / 7vt
111.2 /° pt.v= 0
111.3 /'7v־p.t= ^  vp
3"Validity" refers to the experimental condition; "Trials" to the number of trials
survived, hence behavior; "Propriety" to approval and perceived efficiency measured
after the session.
£
Controlling for Propriety
Table 4: Regression Analysis of the Effects of Validity on Trials Survived
E q . Number Independent Variables Constant N
Validity Propriety^ Propriety^
(Approval) (Approval)
All Participants
la .51 (.84)** .09 (.39) 4.48 55
lb .37 (.83)** -.01 (.37) .38 (.28)** 7.32 55
Collective Action
2a . 68 (.93)** .02 (.46) 4.03 39
2b .54 (.99)** -.05 (.45) .30 (.35)** 6.46 39
Validity Propriety^ Propriety^
(Efficiency) (Efficiency)
All Participants
3a .54 (.85)** .12 (.37) 4.47 53
3b .43 (.82)** .01 (.36) .38 (.27)** 6.54 53
Collective Action
4a .71 (.91)** .04 (.41) 3.89 . 37
4b .61 (.98)** -.03 (.42) .25 (.38)* 5.58 37
*, p <.05 
**, p <•01
3Propriety is measured first by approval and then by perceived efficiency. 
Propriety^ is measured before the bonus instructions (after the experimental 
manipulation in the validity condition); Propriety,, is measured after the session; 
Validity is measured: 1, experimental condition; 0, control condition. 
Standardized regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.
Table 5: Regression Analysis.of the Effects of Validity on Propriety^ Controlling
for Trials Survived
Eq. Number Independent Variables Constant N
Validity Propriety^ Trials
(Approval)
All Participants
la .35 (.39)** .25 (.18)* 3.25 55
lb .13 (.42) .21 (.17)* .43 (.06)** 4.09 55
Collective Action
2a .45 (.42)** .25 (.21) 3.15 39
2b .17 (.54) .24 (.20) .42 (.07)** 3.80 39
Validity Propriety^ Trials
(Efficiency)
All Participants ־ ־
3a .28 (.41)* .30 (.18)** 2.45 53
3b .04 (.45) .24 (.17)* .45 (.06)** 3.35 53
Collective Action
4a .43 (.39)** .29 (.18)* 2.32 37
4b .15 (.54) .27 (.17)* .39 (.07)* 2.85 37
*, p <.05 
**, p <.01
3Propriety is measured first by approval and then by perceived efficiency. 
Propriety^ is measured before the bonus instructions (after the experimental 
manipulation in the validity condition); Propriety^ is measured after the session 
Validity is measured: 1, experimental condition; 0, control condition. 
Standardized regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.
46
Trials Survived
1.00
•90
.80
Proportion •70 
of partici­
pants >6o 
surviving 
through
Trial t .50
.U0
•30
r
.20
Tigure 1: Survival Curves fbr Ail Sub.jects. The proportion of participants
surviving through Trial t, plotted against trial number for baseline 
and validity conditions for all participants.
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Figure 2: Survival Curves for Collective Action- The proportion of 
participants surviving throught Trial t, plotted against 
trial number for baseline and validity conditions, excluding 
non-mobilizing responses.
TRIAL ------- PROPRIE T ?2
Causal Model of Collective Action: Validity, Behavior and 
Propriety. Standardized regression coefficients: Top 
coefficient using approval for propriety; Bottom coefficient 
using efficiency for propriety.
*, p < .05; **, p <.01.
PROPRIETY,
Figure 3:
